Farewell Address to Congress

General Douglas MacArthur

delivered 19 April 1951

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and Distinguished Members of the Congress:

I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride -- humility in the wake of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me; pride in the reflection that this forum of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised. Here are centered the hopes and aspirations and faith of the entire human race. I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American.

I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life, with but one purpose in mind: to serve my country. The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster for the whole. While Asia is commonly referred to as the Gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the Gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other. There are those who claim our strength is inadequate to protect on both fronts, that we cannot divide our effort. I can think of no greater expression of defeatism. If a potential enemy can divide his strength on two fronts, it is for us to counter his effort. The Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector. You can not appease or otherwise surrender to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts to halt its advance in Europe.

Beyond pointing out these general truisms, I shall confine my discussion to the general areas of Asia. Before one may objectively assess the situation now existing there, he must comprehend something of Asia's past and the revolutionary changes which have marked her course up to the present. Long exploited by the so-called colonial powers, with little opportunity to achieve any degree of social justice, individual dignity, or a higher standard of life such as guided our own noble administration in the Philippines, the peoples of Asia found their opportunity in the war just past to throw off the shackles of colonialism and now see the dawn of new opportunity, a heretofore unfelt dignity, and the self-respect of political freedom.

Mustering half of the earth's population, and 60 percent of its natural resources these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of the design of modern progress to their own distinct cultural environments. Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the shift of the world economic frontiers as the whole epicenter of world affairs rotates back toward the area whence it started.

In this situation, it becomes vital that our own country orient its policies in consonance with this basic evolutionary condition rather than pursue a course blind to the reality that the colonial era is now past and the Asian peoples covet the right to shape their own free destiny. What they seek now is friendly guidance, understanding, and support -- not imperious direction -- the dignity of equality and not the shame of subjugation. Their pre-war standard of life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake. World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom. These political-social conditions have but an indirect bearing upon our own national security, but do form a backdrop to contemporary planning which must be thoughtfully considered if we are to avoid the pitfalls of unrealism.

Of more direct and immediately bearing upon our national security are the changes wrought in the strategic potential of the Pacific Ocean in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas, with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines. That salient proved not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack.

The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas. All this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we held it. Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Mariannas held by us and our free allies. From this island chain we can dominate with sea and air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapore -- with sea and air power every port, as I said, from Vladivostok to Singapore -- and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.

*Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort.* No amphibious force can be successful without control of the sea lanes and the air over those lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modest ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends in the Pacific would be doomed to failure.

Under such conditions, the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader. It assumes, instead, the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense. It envisions no attack against anyone, nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained, would be an invincible defense against aggression. The holding of this littoral defense line in the western Pacific is entirely dependent upon holding all segments thereof; for any major breach of that line by an unfriendly power would render vulnerable to determined attack every other major segment.

This is a military estimate as to which I have yet to find a military leader who will take exception. For that reason, I have strongly recommended in the past, as a matter of military urgency, that under no circumstances must Formosa fall under Communist control. Such an eventuality would at once threaten the freedom of the Philippines and the loss of Japan and might well force our western frontier back to the coast of California, Oregon and Washington.

To understand the changes which now appear upon the Chinese mainland, one must understand the changes in Chinese character and culture over the past 50 years. China, up to 50 years ago, was completely non-homogenous, being compartmented into groups divided against each other. The war-making tendency was almost non-existent, as they still followed the tenets of the Confucian ideal of pacifist culture. At the turn of the century, under the regime of Chang Tso Lin, efforts toward greater homogeneity produced the start of a nationalist urge. This was further and more successfully developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, but has been brought to its greatest fruition under the present regime to the point that it has now taken on the character of a united nationalism of increasingly dominant, aggressive tendencies.

Through these past 50 years the Chinese people have thus become militarized in their concepts and in their ideals. They now constitute excellent soldiers, with competent staffs and commanders. This has produced a new and dominant power in Asia, which, for its own purposes, is allied with Soviet Russia but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic, with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism.

There is little of the ideological concept either one way or another in the Chinese make-up. The standard of living is so low and the capital accumulation has been so thoroughly dissipated by war that the masses are desperate and eager to follow any leadership which seems to promise the alleviation of local stringencies.

I have from the beginning believed that the Chinese Communists' support of the North Koreans was the dominant one. Their interests are, at present, parallel with those of the Soviet. But I believe that the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea but also in Indo-China and Tibet and pointing potentially toward the South reflects predominantly the same lust for the expansion of power which has animated every would-be conqueror since the beginning of time.

The Japanese people, since the war, have undergone the greatest reformation recorded in modern history. With a commendable will, eagerness to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the supremacy of individual liberty and personal dignity; and in the ensuing process there has been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of political morality, freedom of economic enterprise, and social justice.

Politically, economically, and socially Japan is now abreast of many free nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust. That it may be counted upon to wield a profoundly beneficial influence over the course of events in Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in which the Japanese people have met the recent challenge of war, unrest, and confusion surrounding them from the outside and checked communism within their own frontiers without the slightest slackening in their forward progress. I sent all four of our occupation divisions to the Korean battlefront without the slightest qualms as to the effect of the resulting power vacuum upon Japan. The results fully justified my faith. I know of no nation more serene, orderly, and industrious, nor in which higher hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the human race.

Of our former ward, the Philippines, we can look forward in confidence that the existing unrest will be corrected and a strong and healthy nation will grow in the longer aftermath of war's terrible destructiveness. We must be patient and understanding and never fail them -- as in our hour of need, they did not fail us. A Christian nation, the Philippines stand as a mighty bulwark of Christianity in the Far East, and its capacity for high moral leadership in Asia is unlimited.

On Formosa, the government of the Republic of China has had the opportunity to refute by action much of the malicious gossip which so undermined the strength of its leadership on the Chinese mainland. The Formosan people are receiving a just and enlightened administration with majority representation on the organs of government, and politically, economically, and socially they appear to be advancing along sound and constructive lines.

With this brief insight into the surrounding areas, I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy.

Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary: first the intensification of our economic blockade against China; two the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; three removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria; four removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the common enemy.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.

We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and in an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized its full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.

Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said, in effect, that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on the second day of September, nineteen hundred and forty-five, just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:

Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start workable methods were found in so far as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliances, balances of power, Leagues of Nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter  destructiveness of war now blocks out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past 2000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh.

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.

War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

In war there is no substitute for victory.

There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.

"Why," my soldiers asked of me, "surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field?" I could not answer.

Some may say: to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.

Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description.

They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific!"

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.

It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety.

Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.

I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that "old soldiers never die; they just fade away."

And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.

Good Bye.

노병(老兵)은 결코 죽지 않는다

- 맥아더(MacArthur)

나는 마음속 깊이 겸허함과 자랑스러운 마음으로 이 연단에 섰습니다. 나 이전에 이곳에 섰던 사람들이 우리 역사의 ‘위대한 건설자’였음을 깨달았기에 겸허한 마음이 생기고, 이 나라의 입법부는 오늘날에 이르기까지 창안해 낸 것 중에 가장 순수한 형태로 인간의 자유를 대표한다는 생각에 자랑스러운 마음을 느낍니다.

전 인류의 희망과 열망과 신념이 이곳에 집중되어 있습니다. 나는 어떤 당파적인 대의명분을 위한 옹호자로서 이 자리에 선 것이 아닙니다. 왜냐하면 내가 말하려는 문제들은 근본적이며 당파적인 고려의 범위를 훨씬 능가하는 것들이기 때문입니다. 만일 우리의 장래를 보호하고 우리의 방침을 분석하려면 이러한 문제들은 국가의 최대 관심사로서 해결되어야만 합니다.

그러므로 나는 여러분께서 내가 이제부터 말씀드리는 것은 단지 한 미국인 동포가 숙고한 바의 견해를 표명하는 것이라고 공정하게 받아 주실 것으로 믿습니다.

나는 지금 저물어 가는 인생의 황혼을 맞이해서 아무런 원한도 반감도 없이 오직 나의 조국을 위해서 봉사하겠다는 단 한 가지 목적으로 여러분께 말씀드리는 것입니다.

이 문제들은 전 세계적이며 매우 연동(聯動)적이기 때문에, 한 분야의 문제를 망각하고 다른 분야의 문제를 생각한다면 전체적인 재난을 초래하게 될 것입니다. 흔히 아시아는 유럽의 관문이라고 말합니다만, 유럽이 아시아의 관문이라는 것도 이에 못지않는 진리입니다. 그러므로 한 지역의 광대한 영향력은 다른 지역에도 그 영향을 끼칠 수 있다는 것입니다.

우리의 힘으로는 양쪽 전선을 방어하기에 부적당하며 우리의 노력을 분할 할 수도 없다고 주장하는 사람들이 있습니다.

나는 이보다 더 큰 패배주의의 표현을 생각해 낼 수 없습니다. 만일, 가상(假想)의 적군이 그 힘을 두 전선에 분할할 수 있다고 한다면 우리는 그들의 노력에 대항해야 합니다. 공산주의자의 위협이라는 것은 전 세계적입니다. 한 지역에서 성공적인 진전을 보게 되면 다른 모든 지역의 파괴를 위협하게 됩니다. 여러분께서는 유럽에서 그들의 진출을 막아내려는 우리의 노력을 동시에 기울이지 않고는 아시아에서 공산주의를 굴복시키거나 진정시킬 수 없습니다.

나는 처음부터 중국 공산당의 지원을 받은 북한이 가장 유력한 공산주의 국가라고 믿었습니다. 그들의 관심사는 현재 한국뿐만 아니라 최근에 인도차이나와 티벳에서 드러낸 것과 같은 경향을 띠고 있어서 잠재적으로 남쪽을 향하여 겨누고 있으며, 태초 이래 모든 것에는 정복자가 존재했을 것이라는 고무된 힘의 확장을 위하여 같은 욕망이 우세하게 반영되고 있습니다.

한국 정부의 지원에 개입할 것이라는 대통령의 결정에 앞서 나는 대통령과 의논하지 않았지만, 군사적 관점으로 그 결정은 적절한 결정이었음이 입증되었습니다. 내가 그 결정은 적절한 결정으로 입증되었다고 말할 때는 우리가 그 침략자를 격퇴시키고 침략자의 군대를 파멸시켰을 때를 말합니다. 우리의 승리는 완벽했으며, 우리의 목적이 거의 이루어지려고 했습니다. 그때 숫자적으로 우세한 중공군의 보병이 개입했습니다.

이것은 새로운 전쟁과 완전히 새로운 사태를 만들어 냈는데, 이러한 사태는 북한 침략자에 대항하여 우리 군대를 파견했을 때에는 전혀 예상하지 못했던 것입니다. 이러한 사태는 외교적인 분야에서 현실적인 군사 전략의 조정을 인가하도록 새로운 결정을 요청하는 것이었습니다. 그러한 결정은 마련되어 있었던 것이 아니었습니다.

올바른 정신을 가진 사람이라면 우리의 지상군을 중국 대륙에 파견할 것을 주장할 사람은 없을 것이며, 그러한 것을 전혀 생각조차 해본 적이 없을 것입니다. 만약 우리의 정치적 목표가 과거에 적을 무찔렀던 것처럼 이 새로운 적을 무찌르는 데 있다면, 이 새로운 사태는 과감한 작전 계획의 수정을 긴급히 요구하는 것이었습니다. 나는 압록강 이북의 적군에게 주어진 모호 성역을 무력화시키는 것이 군사적으로 필요하다고 본 것 이외에, 전쟁 수행상 다음과 같은 조처가 군사적으로 필요하다는 것을 느꼈습니다.

첫째, 중공에 대하여 우리의 경제적 봉쇄를 강화할 것.

둘째, 중국 연안에 해군 봉쇄를 가할 것.

셋째, 중국 연안 지역과 만주 지역의 공중 정찰에 대한 제한을 해제할 것.

넷째, 대만에 있는 중화민국 군대에 대한 제한을 해제하는 동시에 그들이 중국 본토에 대하여 효과적인 작전을 수행할

수 있도록 병참 지원을 할 것.

한국에 파견된 우리의 군대를 지원하고, 수많은 미국인과 연합국인의 생명을 구원하기 위해 가능한 한 이 전쟁을 빨리 끝내야겠다는, 전문적으로 모든 계획된 견해를 가졌다는 것만으로 나는 적대감을 불러일으켰으며, 특히 외국으로부터 신랄하게 비난을 받아 왔습니다. 위에서 말한 견해들은 사실 유엔의 공동 참모를 비롯하여 한국 전쟁에 관심을 가진 모든 군사 지도자들도 과거에 공감했던 것인데도 비난을 받았던 것입니다.

나는 증원군을 요청했지만 증원군을 보낼 수 없다는 통고를 받았습니다. 만약 압록강 이북에 적이 구축해 놓은 기지를 파괴할 것을 허가하지 않는다면, 대만에 있는 60만 중화민국 우군을 활용할 것을 허가하지 않는다면, 중공군이 외부로부터 원조받는 것을 방지하기 위하여 중국 해안 봉쇄를 허가하지 않는다면, 그리고 대(大)증원군의 파견을 바랄 수 없다면, 나는 군사적 관점에서 사령부의 입장으로는 결코 승리할 수 없다는 것을 확실히 밝히는 바입니다.

우리는 한국에서 끊임없는 기동 작전과 아군의 보급선상의 유리함이 적군의 보급선상의 불리함으로 균형을 유지하는 적합한 지역에서 주도권을 잡을 수 있습니다. 그러나 만일 적군이 잠재적인 전군사력을 활용한다면 그들의 혹독하고도 끊임없는 소모전을 우리 군대에 퍼부어 우리는 고작 승부미결(勝負未決)의 전쟁밖에는 희망할 수 없을 것입니다.

나는 새로운 정치적 사태 해결을 위해서는 긴요하다고 끊임없이 요청했었습니다.

그러나 나의 노력은 나의 입장을 왜곡하게 만들었습니다. 사실 나는 전쟁 도발자로 불려졌던 것입니다. 이보다 더 진리와 동떨어진 것은 없을 것입니다.

현재 살아 있는 몇몇 사람들이 전쟁에 대하여 알고 있는 것처럼 나도 전쟁을 알고 있지만, 전쟁처럼 내가 혐오하는 것도 없습니다. 우방과 적측 모두 전쟁에서 받는 그 무서운 파괴성으로 말미암아 전쟁은 국제적 분쟁의 해결 수단으로서 아무 가치가 없다고 보고 나는 오랫동안 전쟁의 완전 폐지를 주장했던 것입니다.

사실 1945년 9월 2일, 미주리 전함에서 일본이 항복 문서에 서명한 바로 그 이튿날, 나는 정식으로 다음과 같이 경고했습니다.

"태초 이래 인간은 평화를 희구해 왔습니다. 국가 사이의 분쟁을 해결하고 미연에 방지하기 위한 국제적인 과정이 수세기를 걸쳐 다양한 방법으로 시도되어 왔습니다. 단지 시초가 개인 간의 분쟁인 경우에는 실현 가능한 방법들이 발견되지만 보다 넓은 국제적 범위의 중재 기구로서는 결코 성공한 적이 없습니다.

군사 동맹·힘의 균형·국제연맹, 이 모든 방법은 실패로 돌아갔고 오직 전쟁이라는 도가니가 남아 있을 뿐입니다. 현재 전쟁의 극단적인 파괴력은 이러한 양자택일의 방법마저 어둡게 하고 있습니다. 우리는 마지막 기회를 가지고 있습니다. 만약 우리가 좀 더 위대하고 좀 더 공평한 제도를 고안해 내지 않는다면 최후의 종말을 위한 대 결전을 맞이해야 할 것입니다.

문제는 근본적으로 신학적이고 정신적인 재연에 뒤얽힌 것이어서, 인간성의 재량은 과거 2천년 동안의 과학·예술·문학 등 모든 물질적·문화적 발전에서 거의 비길 데 없는 진전과 동시성을 가져야만 합니다. 만일 우리가 육체를 구원하려고 한다면 정신의 구원이 이루어져야만 합니다."

그러나 일단 전쟁이 우리에게 강요된 이상, 전쟁을 신속히 종결시키기 위해서 유효한 모든 수단들을 적용하는 것밖에 아무 도리가 없는 것입니다. 전쟁의 최종 목적은 승리이지 우유부단한 연장이 아닙니다.

전쟁에서 승리를 대신할 만한 것이 없습니다. 한국의 비극은 그 군사적 행동이 한국의 영토 범위 내에 제한되어 있다는 사실로 말미암아 더 한층 고조되고 있습니다.

우리가 구원하고자 원하는 이 나라는 전격적인 함포 사격과 공중 폭격의 파괴적인 영향으로 고통받는 기막힌 운명에 처해 있는데도 불구하고, 적의 은둔처는 그러한 공격과 파괴로부터 완전히 보호되어 있습니다.

세계의 모든 국가 중에서 오직 한국만이 현재까지 공산주의에 대항하여 그 모든 것을 무릅쓰고 있는 유일한 국가입니다.

한국인의 불굴의 정신과 대단한 용기는 언급할 필요가 없습니다. 그들은 노예가 되기보다는 차라리 죽음을 무릅쓰는 길을 택했습니다. 그들이 나에게 보내 온 최후의 말은 "태평양을 단념하지 마시오!"라는 부탁이었습니다.

나는 52년간의 나의 군대 생활의 막을 내리려고 합니다. 내가 군(軍)에 입대했을 때는 세기(世紀)의 전환기 전이었지만, 나의 소년 시절의 모든 꿈과 희망을 실현하기 위한 것이었습니다.

내가 웨스트포인트(미국 육군사관학교)에서 임관 선서식을 거행한 이래 세상이 몇 차례 뒤바뀌었고, 기억이 희미해지는 가운데 나의 희망과 꿈을 오래 지니고 있습니다. 그러나 그 당시 가장 인기가 있었던 군가 중 한 곡의 후렴을 아직도 기억하고 있는데, 그것은 매우 당당하게 "노병은 결코 죽지 않는다. 그들은 다만 사라질 뿐이다"라고 찬양하는 것입니다.

그 군가의 노병처럼, 지금 나는 나의 군인으로서의 생애에 막을 내리고 다만 사라지려고 합니다. 하느님께서 그에게 광명을 내리셔서 자신의 의무를 이행하려고 노력한 노병이 그 의무를 다하게 해주소서! 안녕히 계십시오.

※ 이 연설문은 1951년 4월 19일, 맥아더 원수가 의회에서 자신의 행위에 대한 옹호론을 주장한 연설 내용이다.